Richmond Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 14 | Issue 4

Article 4

2008

Perfect Enforcement Of Law: When To Limit And
When To Use Technology
Christina M. Mulligan

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Christina M. Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement Of Law: When To Limit And When To Use Technology, 14 Rich. J.L. & Tech 13 (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt/vol14/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Richmond Journal of Law
and Technology by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 4

PERFECT ENFORCEMENT OF LAW:
WHEN TO LIMIT AND WHEN TO USE TECHNOLOGY
By: Christina M. Mulligan*

Cite as: Christina M. Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to
Limit and When to Use Technology, 14 RICH J.L. & TECH. 13 (2008),
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v14i4/article13.pdf.

I. INTRODUCTION
[1] Road safety cameras can photograph your car running red lights.1
Some bars record information on driver’s licenses to establish that their
patrons are old enough to drink.2 The Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) uses automated web crawlers3 to try to find illegal copies

*

Harvard Law School ’08. Beginning in September 2008, the author will be an associate
at Winston & Strawn LLP in San Francisco, CA. She would like to thank Jonathan
Zittrain for his thoughtful comments and tremendous help crystallizing this article, as
well as Peter Koellner of the Harvard Philosophy Department and Jim Waldo of Sun
Microsystems and the Harvard Computer Science Department. Thanks are also due to the
many whose scholarship, lectures, or conversation influenced and inspired portions of
this work, including Randy Barnett, Terry Fisher, Allan Friedman, Abel Roasa, Michael
Smith, Mark Tushnet, and all those who took part in Harvard’s Computer Science 199r
course in Spring 2007.
1
See Tom Harris, How Red-Light Cameras Work, Howstuffworks.com,
http://auto.howstuffworks.com/red-light-camera.htm/printable (last visited Nov. 10,
2007).
2
See Jennifer 8. Lee, Welcome to the Database Lounge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002 at
G1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/21/technology/circuits/21DRIV.html.
3
A web crawler is a program that methodically scans or “crawls” through Internet pages
to create an index of the data it is looking for. See WiseGeek.com, What is a Web
Crawler?, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-web-crawler.htm (last visited June 4,
2007).
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of mp3s,4 and iTunes embeds personal identifying information in the
tracks of every song you buy.5
[2] Both public and private parties are harnessing technology to enforce
law more accurately and efficiently, approaching a “perfect enforcement”
of some laws. These measures are often more accurate and less costly
than hiring dozens of investigators and police officers to do similar work.6
However, the invasiveness and omnipresence of these measures can make
those who are monitored feel downright uncomfortable.
[3] “Uncomfortable” is not much to hang your hat on. Those who are
quick to express concern that “they” are watching us can appear alarmist.
Yet, many feel that there is a real and very significant cost to using
technology to enforce laws. But what is it?
[4] A few legal writers, notably Daniel Solove,7 Eugene Volokh,8 and
Jonathan Zittrain,9 have discussed the use of perfect law enforcing
technologies. Yet, relatively little has been written on the subject. There
are many kinds of law enforcing technologies, and each raises a variety of
concerns. This article provides a framework which can be used to
determine the wisdom of using a technology to enforce law by explaining
4

See RIAA, Worldwide Music Industry Coordinates Its Strategy Against Piracy, Oct. 28,
1999,
http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?news_year_filter=&resultpage=114&id=323A12AC539B-2909-BC1F-654DD1644E9E (last visited Apr. 10, 2008); see also Declan
McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Erroneous Letters, CNETNews.com, May 13, 2003,
http://news.com.com/2102-1025_3-1001319.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) [hereinafter
McCullagh, Erroneous Letters].
5
See ‘Personal Data’ in iTunes Tracks, BBC NEWS, June 1, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/
6711215.stm (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
6
See e.g., Posting of Randy Picker to the University of Chicago Law School Faculty
Blog, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/05/more_driving_do.html (May 26,
2006, 15:59 CST); Posting of Daniel J. Solove to Concurring Opinions,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/
10/do_we_really_wa_1.html (Oct. 12, 2005, 00:15 EST).
7
See Solove, supra note 6.
8
See Eugene Volokh, Traffic Enforcement Cameras, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2002, at A22,
available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/cameras.htm.
9
See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET — AND HOW TO STOP IT 10317 (2008).
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the several types of perfect enforcement and analyzing the concerns raised
by their use.
[5] When considering whether to use technology to enforce law, a
decision-maker should make four determinations. First, is the aversion to
using the technology an aversion to the method of enforcing the law or a
disagreement with the underlying substantive law? Second, will the
technology effectively enforce the law? Third, is the use of the
technology constitutional? And finally, does the technology trigger any
other philosophical concerns?
[6] In some cases, the use of technology will plainly be justified or
unjustified. More often, the appropriateness of using technology will
depend on the particular facts and circumstances of its use. Even when
these grey situations arise, this article’s structure and explanation of
concerns can be used as a means to help legislators, law enforcers, and
policymakers make more informed decisions about when technology
should be used to enforce law.
II. WHAT KIND OF PERFECT ENFORCEMENT?
[7] “Perfect enforcement” can come in several forms. This article is
principally concerned with two, perfect prevention and perfect
surveillance, but will discuss a third, perfect correction, briefly.
[8] A technology which “perfectly prevents” a law violation preempts the
law violation entirely.10 Perfect prevention technology includes Digital
Rights Management (“DRM”) systems, which prevent access and copying
of media. A perfect prevention technology can also be indirect; for
example government systems designed to identify terrorist attacks before
they take place qualify as a prevention technology.
[9] A “perfect surveillance” technology would not interfere with the act of
violating the law but would detect every instance of its violation.11
10

Jonathan Zittrain has identified this type of perfect enforcement by another name. Id.
at 108 (identifying “preemption” as a type of perfect enforcement).
11
Id. at 109-10. Michael Adler’s “perfect search” would also be an example of a
technology designed to perfectly punish. See Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General
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Technologies which aspire to “perfectly survey” include red light traffic
cameras and the RIAA’s web crawlers. Unlike DRM, the web crawlers do
not interfere with the copying or distribution of media; they merely
identify the source of the media. The RIAA then uses the information the
web crawler discovered to file a law suit against providers of the illegally
copied media.12
[10] Other types of perfect enforcement which are not considered at
length in this article include what Jonathan Zittrain terms “specific
injunction”13 but which might more broadly be called “perfect correction.”
Perfect correction is possible when a piece of technology continues to
communicate with its manufacturer; examples include Digital Video
Recorders (DVRs) or computer software that is set to receive automatic
updates.14
Perfect enforcement by correction would occur if a
manufacturer retroactively “undid” harms after their occurrence, either by
court order or its own volition.15 A recent example of this was the remote
reprogramming of Apple iPhones which had been altered to work on
multiple mobile networks.16 Another example is TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar
Communications Corp., in which a district court ordered the company
Echostar to stop most of the DVR boxes it had already sold from
functioning because they infringed patents owned by TiVo.17
[11] This article is primarily concerned with perfect prevention and
punishment, although many concerns raised about perfect prevention are
also relevant to perfect correction.

Searches, and Digital Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search,
105 YALE L.J. 1093 (1996).
12
Worldwide Music Industry Coordinates Its Strategy Against Piracy, supra note 4.
13
ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 108-09.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 109.
16
See Apple iPhone Warning Proves True, BBC NEWS, Sept. 28, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
Technology/7017660.stm (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
17
TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, remanded, 516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For an extended
discussion of TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Communications Corp., and its implications, see
ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 103–04, 108.
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III. AVERSIONS TO THE UNDERLYING SUBSTANTIVE LAW
[12] As mentioned in the introduction, the idea of perfect law
enforcement makes people nervous. But is this nervousness misplaced?
Some of the discomfort comes not from concerns about privacy or
government power, but from a concrete disagreement with the substance
of laws themselves. Consider how many individuals consume alcohol at
least once before they are twenty-one, smoke marijuana, break the speed
limit, or pirate media. Many of these lawbreakers are generally lawabiding and productive members of society. Furthermore, many of these
lawbreakers are also principled about their lawbreaking; they believe the
laws are poorly crafted or simply wrong and do not consider themselves
immoral.
[13] Thus, it is unsurprising when, for instance, someone in favor of the
legalization of marijuana is opposed to random drug testing. As it has not
been politically feasible to repeal anti-drug laws, proponents of marijuana
use may find more political success by opposing drug testing on the
grounds that it is a violation of privacy. Their objection to testing may
have little if anything to do with privacy and everything to do with their
opposition to the substance of anti-drug laws. In cases of this type,
aversion to technology can merely be a proxy for aversion to the law.
[14] Opposition to a technology can also be inspired when individuals
oppose only some enforcements of a law. In 2000, the Hawaii
transportation department began using cameras mounted on vans to catch
anyone driving six or more miles over the speed limit.18 One journalist
observed, “it became possibly the most hated public policy initiative in
Hawaii’s history, almost uniformly disliked, even by those who thought it
actually worked.”19 The program was cancelled in 2002, largely due to
public outcry.20 Afterwards, traffic violations were detected the oldfashioned and less-perfect way. Daniel Solove hypothesized that the
outcry could be explained by individuals’ ambivalent views towards
18

See Solove, supra note 6.
Mike Leidemann, Few Saying Aloha to Van Cams Fondly, HONOLULU ADVERTISER,
Apr. 14, 2002, available at
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2002/Apr/14/ln/ln05a.html.
20
Id. See also Solove, supra note 6.
19
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speeding laws.21 While people generally agree with speeding laws, they
also believe there are many occasions when it is permissible to violate
them.22
[15] In contrast to the above examples, Eugene Volokh has suggested that
“broader and more evenhanded enforcement will generally (not always,
but usually) lead to improvements in the law. If lots of citizens get pulled
over for speeding, and the limit also ends up making everyone else drive
too slowly, City Hall will react.”23 Volokh’s vision of using better
enforcement to fuel the revision of poorly crafted laws is plausible but
may not always come to pass. Few who hope for a bright future in politics
will risk fallout from suggesting that maybe speeders, amateur music
pirates, or those who do not wear seatbelts should not be reprimanded.
While some very unpopular laws may be changed, politicians may avoid
altering controversial laws for fear of losing their own popularity in a
public relations mishap. On the other hand, avoiding the use of an
enforcement technology because the public does not fully agree with a law
smacks of absurdity, especially as it will result in a more random portion
of the lawbreaking population being caught.24
[16] Determining whether enforcement technologies should be opposed if
a law is unjust is beyond the scope of this article. However, as the
discussion in this article progresses, one should be careful not to conflate a
concern about a law with a concern about an enforcement technology.
Separating these concerns will allow objections to the technology to be
21

Solove, supra note 6.
Id.
23
Eugene Volokh, Questions Following Traffic Enforcement Cameras,
http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/
cameras.htm (last visited June 18, 2007).
24
While beyond the scope of this Article, in cases where a law is generally just, it may be
wise to add a human, discretionary element into a system of near-perfect enforcement.
For example, Hawaii could keep its “traffic vans,” but instead of ticketing everyone who
drove six miles over the speed limit, an individual would have to make an independent
judgment about whether the ticket was justified. Thus, those speeding to keep up with
the flow of traffic or on a virtually empty road could be spared, but those dangerously
zigzagging between lanes or traffic would be punished more often. This exercise in
discretion will fit better with the public’s conception of a fair application of the law, and
the more targeted enforcement will result in greater fairness and punishment of those who
deserve reprimand.
22
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made more clearly by taking the focus off the substance of the law and
placing it on the law enforcement method itself.
IV. LOGISTICAL CONCERNS
[17] If technology were always accurate and lawmakers could always
foresee the effects of their decisions, one might be very tempted to
embrace perfect enforcement of law. But this utopia is not the world we
live in. Computer programs can make mistakes, laws can be unjust, and
even the best laid plans can have horrific, unintended side effects. Even if
using technology to enforce law were a good idea in theory, does it have a
shot in practice? This section will discuss the logistical objections to
using technology to enforce law, by identifying situations when using
technology to enforce law should be avoided.
A. FEASIBILITY
[18] In contrast to the examples in the previous section, there are some
areas of law where general consensus exists. Almost everyone wants to
prevent terrorist attacks and supports some kind of government action to
prevent them. With stakes so high and emotions so volatile, the idea of
finding terrorists by analyzing transactional data is appealing. Yet, law
enforcers must realistically assess if their goals are possible before
spending tax dollars and aggregating personal information (two activities
which, we will stipulate, are undesirable standing alone). Consider, for
example, some of the government programs following the attack on the
World Trade Center in 2001.
[19] After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many suggested
that the attacks could have been prevented if American intelligence
agencies could have better “connected the dots.”25 The attackers had acted
suspiciously before the hijackings — taking flight lessons, purchasing lastminute one-way plane tickets using cash, and participating in suspicious
25

“Certain agencies and apologists talk about connecting the dots, but one of the
problems is to know which dots to connect.” Remarks as prepared for delivery by Dr.
John Poindexter, Director, Information Awareness Office of DARPA, at DARPATech
2002 Conference (Aug. 2, 2002), http://www.fas.org/irp/
agency/dod/poindexter.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
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banking activity.26 Looking backwards in time, it is easy to see how these
extremists could have been planning a terrorist attack. But could an attack
be anticipated by looking forward?
[20] There is a prima facie sense that the September 11th hijackers could
have been identified and linked to one another. Hijackers Nawaq Alhamzi
and Khalid Al-Midhar bought tickets to fly on American Airlines Flight
77 (which was flown into the Pentagon) using their real names.27 Both
were on the State Department/INS watch list called TIPOFF and both
were sought by the FBI and CIA as suspected terrorists because they had
been seen at a meeting with other terrorists in Malaysia.28 From their
identities, authorities could have discovered three more of the hijackers.29
One shared an address with Alhamzi and also bought a seat on American
Airlines Flight 77.30 More importantly, authorities might have discovered
Mohamed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi, who shared an address with AlMidhar and who bought tickets on the two flights which flew into the
World Trade Center towers.31
[21] Two systems of particular relevance were proposed to anticipate
terrorist activity: the more modestly-aimed Computer Assisted Passenger
Pre-screening System II (“CAPPS II”)32 and the grander Total Information
Awareness (“TIA”).33
These programs were attempts at perfect
prevention, designed to anticipate criminal activity and more-perfectly
prevent it.
[22] The CAPPS II system would have airlines ask passengers for four
pieces of information: full name, date of birth, home address, and home
26

MARKLE FOUNDATION TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE, PROTECTING AMERICA’S FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE 28 (Oct. 2002),
available at http://www.markle.org/downloadable_assets/nstf_full.pdf.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Press Release, Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: CAPPS II at a Glance (Feb. 12, 2004),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0347.shtm.
33
See Military Intelligence System Draws Controversy, CNN.com, Nov. 20, 2002,
http://archives.cnn.com/
2002/US/11/20/terror/tracking/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
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telephone number.34 With this information, the system would “conduct a
risk assessment” using “commercially available data and current
intelligence information” to determine if a passenger is “no risk, unknown
or elevated risk, or high risk.”35 While the phrase “commercially available
data” is not explained, it likely includes the kind of information available
from private corporations such as ChoicePoint, which aggregate and sell
records of an individual’s criminal activity, education, financial history,
employment, and residences, as well as other information.36
[23] According to several officials who worked closely on CAPPS II, but
who declined to speak publicly about it, officials first “sought to identify
passengers who were not ‘deeply rooted’ in a community,” moving often
or lacking an established credit history.37 But the system produced too
many false positives, identifying many airline passengers as “risky” who
were little threat.38 “I am just not prepared to say that because someone
can’t get a mortgage, they are a terrorist threat to an airplane,” said a
former official, speaking to the Washington Post on condition of
anonymity.39 “These data aggregator products are used today in the
financial world to identify certain things, and they’re not designed to
identify potential terrorist threats.”40
[24] Of greater aspirations and greater failure was the Total Information
Awareness program (“TIA”) (also known as Terrorism Information
Awareness), for which Congress eliminated funding in the Fall of 2003.41
34

Press Release, supra note 32.
Id.
36
See ChoicePoint, http://www.choicepoint.com (last visited June 4, 2007); ChoiceTrust,
http://www.choicetrust.com (last visited June 4, 2007).
37
Arshad Mohammed & Sara K. Goo, Government Increasingly Turning to Data Mining,
WASH. POST, June 15, 2006, at D03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/14/
AR2006061402063.html.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2004). The law which eliminated funding stated,
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds
appropriated or otherwise made available in this or any other Act may
be obligated for the Terrorism Information Awareness Program:
35
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Unlike CAPPS II, which assessed the risk of particular subjects, TIA
attempted to use a “pattern based” search to find potential terrorists.
Pattern-based searches look for information which matches or departs
from a pattern, instead of searching for instances of a particular
individual’s activity.42 TIA’s goal was to detect terrorist activities from
the billions of commercial transactions occurring in society every day.43
[25] While many were concerned with whether TIA would violate an
individual’s privacy,44 few expressed concern about whether the program
Provided, [t]hat this limitation shall not apply to the program hereby
authorized for Processing, analysis, and collaboration tools for
counterterrorism foreign intelligence, as described in the Classified
Annex accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Act,
2004, for which funds are expressly provided in the National Foreign
Intelligence Program for counterterrorism foreign intelligence
purposes.
(b) None of the funds provided for Processing, analysis, and
collaboration tools for counterterrorism foreign intelligence shall be
available for deployment or implementation except for:
(1) lawful military operations of the United States conducted outside
the United States; or
(2) lawful foreign intelligence activities conducted wholly overseas, or
wholly against non-United States citizens.
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8131(a)–(b), 117 Stat.
1054, 1102 (2004). Four research programs of the Information Awareness Office were
continued, but none were related to “pattern analysis” or “data mining.” See H.R. CONF.
REP. NO. 108-283, at 327 (2003), as reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1168, 1189.
42
See Dempsey & Flint, supra note 41, at 1464.
43
See John Poindexter, Director, Information Awareness Office of DARPA, Remarks at
DARPA Tech 2002 Conference (Aug. 2, 2002), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/poindexter.html.
44
See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Under a Watchful Eye: Incursions on Personal
Privacy, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS 128, 132 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr.,
eds., 2003) (“At the extreme [datamining] could be a vehicle for politically motivated
spying and intimidation reminiscent of the worst features of the J. Edgar Hoover era.”);
William Safire, You Are a Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A35 (“[John]
Poindexter is now realizing his 20-year dream: getting the ‘data-mining’ power to snoop
on every public and private act of every American . . . . Poindexter’s assault on individual
privacy rides roughshod over such oversight. He is determined to break down the wall
between commercial snooping and secret government intrusion.”); American Civil
Liberties Union: Q&A on the Pentagon’s “Total Information Awareness” Program,
http://www.aclu.org/privacy/spying/15578res20030420.html (last visited June 5, 2007)
(“[TIA] would kill privacy in America.”).
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could be effective at all. The “pattern based” search approach dramatically
increases the amount of actions that must be watched and, more
relevantly, increases the sets of actions that must be watched.45 Unlike
CAPPS II, TIA would have to identify one person’s identity across
databases without a reliable “starting place,” such as the plane ticket
purchase which triggers a CAPPS II investigation.46 While driver’s
license numbers and social security numbers uniquely identify an
individual, they are often not recorded in commercial transactions, such as
paying for flight lessons or buying products which could be used in
explosives.
[26] The TIA was not merely interested in individuals, but rather patterns
of behavior, which could occur among small groups of terrorists working
together.47 For a population of n people, the set of all sets of those people
is 2n.48 Certainly this is astronomically larger than the sets worth
watching, but even for a small population, the number of sets worth
surveillance is probably going to be larger than the number of atoms in the
universe, which is estimated to be between 2240 and 2320.49 Even if we
were only watching the activities of sixty-four people, the number of
possible sets of those people exceeds the address space of the largest
server computers which existed in 2003.50
[27] Suppose also that on a particular day there are 10,000 applications
for a visa or passport, 10,000 applications for a driver’s license, 10,000
airline ticket purchases, and 10,000 purchases of nitrogen fertilizer. If a
terrorist were working with partners or using different identities, the
program would need to determine if any of the combinations of
transactions was suspicious.
In this case, there are 10,0004 or
45

See e.g. Dempsy & Flint, supra note 41, at 1464 (explaining that pattern-based
searches involve searching “large databases when the query does not name a specific
individual, address, identification number, or other personally identifiable data element . .
. .”).
46
See id. at 1466 (“[P]attern-based searches involve queries in the absence of
particularized suspicion for data patterns believed to be associated with terrorism.”).
47
Jim Waldo, Analysis of TIA Technology on Privacy (Mar. 17, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). The author is very grateful to Dr. Waldo for permitting
her to describe his analysis of TIA in this article.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
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10,000,000,000,000,000 (ten thousand trillion) combinations, assuming
(falsely) that only transactions made on the same day are relevant.51
[28] The TIA could have been effective if it were only watching the
transactions of a few particular individuals under suspicion. But looking
only at pre-determined suspicious individuals misses the point of the
program — to determine who is suspicious from the patterns of behavior.
[29] For those concerned about the costs of perfect law enforcement, the
lesson from TIA and CAPPS II is that the wisdom of using technology to
enforce laws (or, in this case, to prevent the breaking of laws) is a function
not only of the need for the technology but also of the effectiveness.
Individuals and tax payers should resist privacy-invading, expensive
programs when positive results are non-existent. Similarly, bureaucrats
and lawmakers should consider carefully the technological feasibility of a
program before implementing it.
B. ACCURACY
[30] A second logistical concern about using technology to catch
instances of lawbreaking is that the technology may be inaccurate.
Consider red light cameras, which automatically photograph cars entering
and speeding through an intersection, usually printing on the photo the
date, time, location, speed of the car, and elapsed time between when the
light turned red and the car entered the intersection.52 Sometimes, the
cameras have been known to make mistakes.53 However, red light

51

Id. at 9–10.
For more details on how red light cameras function, see Tom Harris, Howstuffworks
“How Red-light Cameras Work,” http://auto.howstuffworks.com/red-lightcamera.htm/printable (last visited June 7, 2007).
53
See, e.g., Molly Smithsimon, Private Lives, Public Spaces: The Surveillance State,
DISSENT, Winter 2003, at 43, available at http://dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=534
(“After data were released in San Diego, the court threw out hundreds of traffic tickets.
The data showed that accidents at monitored intersections actually increased. The city’s
vendor company (Lockheed Martin IMS) had shortened the yellow-light time to capture
more offenders.”); Nicholas J. Garber et al., An Evaluation of Red Light Camera (PhotoRed) Enforcement Programs in Virginia: A Report in Response to a Request by
Virginia’s Secretary of Transportation 91-93 (Jan. 2005),
http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/05-vdot.pdf (discussing possible malfunctions of
52
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cameras catch many law violators at intersections that the police simply do
not have the manpower to patrol.
[31] A citation from a red light camera produces unease because the
average person does not know how to challenge it. If a police officer had
seen the driver run a light, the driver could attempt to undermine the
officer’s account of events. Were you wearing your glasses? When did
you see the light change? Did your partner in the squad car notice the
light was red as well? The only way to undermine the camera, however, is
by determining if it was functioning properly, which might require
technological savvy beyond that of the typical driver.
[32] Needing technical expertise or needing to hire an expert witness to
challenge a ticket, however, should not be conflated with a lack of
confidence in the accuracy of the camera. Indeed, a faulty camera is more
likely to be noticed than an officer who typically tickets people who did
not actually run lights, because a camera’s accuracy can easily be
empirically tested. Mere unease with technology, with the strangeness of
a machine claiming that a law has been broken, is a poor reason to resist
its use.
[33] Whether a technology inaccurately identifies law breaking is
important even if mistaken identifications can be corrected in court. This
is especially true if false positives place great burdens on individuals
wrongly accused. Consider, for example, how the Recording Industry
Association of America (“RIAA”) uses automated web crawlers to scour
the Internet and find material being distributed in violation of federal
copyright law.54 Several times in the past few years, innocent individuals
were greatly inconvenienced by mistakes made by the RIAA web
crawlers.

the cameras and the possibility of false positives) (cited in ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 291
n.74).
54
See Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Threatening Letter (May 12, 2003),
http://www.news.com/2100-1025_3-1001095.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2008)
[hereinafter McCullagh, Threatening Letter].
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[34] In May 2003, the RIAA sent a DMCA notice55 to Penn State
University alleging that one of the astronomy and astrophysics
department’s FTP sites was unlawfully distributing songs by musician
Peter Usher.56 The site had been flagged because a folder contained the
work of a professor emeritus Peter Usher and because the site hosted an
mp3 file of an a cappella song performed by astronomers.57 In the days
that followed, the RIAA admitted that it had erroneously sent dozens of
copyright infringement notices.58 In an e-mail sent to CNETNews.com,
the RIAA explained that “individuals look at each and every notice we
send out. In this particular instance, a temp employee made a mistake and
did not follow RIAA’s established protocol . . . .”59 The RIAA also
admitted that it does not require its copyright enforcers to listen to
allegedly infringing songs.60
[35] In a similar incident, the RIAA threatened to sue an innocent woman
for sharing copyrighted music. Sarah Ward, a sixty-six year old retired
school teacher, was accused of downloading “I’m a Thug” by rapper Trick
Daddy, among other songs.61 A self-described “computer neophyte,”
Ward’s computer could not have downloaded the infringing songs.62 She
only used a Macintosh, which could not run the file-sharing program
Kazaa that she was accused of using.63
[36] The RIAA sued Ward because Comcast had assigned her the Internet
Protocol (“IP”) address associated with infringing Kazaa user Heath7.64
Although it is less clear in this case what caused the error, there are
55

Under section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), copyright
owners such as the RIAA can request Internet service providers remove or disable access
to copyrighted material and can subpoena an Internet service provider to discover the
name of a copyright infringer using their servers or network. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)–(3),
(h) (2000).
56
McCullagh, Threatening Letter, supra note 54.
57
Id.
58
McCullagh, Erroneous Letters, supra note 4.
59
McCullagh, Threatening Letter, supra note 54.
60
Id.
61
Chris Gaither, Recording Industry Withdraws Suit: Mistaken Identity Raises Questions
on Legal Strategy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2003, at C1.
62
Id.
63
Id..
64
Id.
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several possibilities. Comcast could have matched the wrong name to the
IP address provided by the RIAA, or the RIAA could have misidentified
the IP address.65
[37] The RIAA is understandably reluctant to eliminate web crawlers
because they can identify more instances of infringement than can be
identified by a team of humans. But, by including a human component to
check the findings of the web crawlers (as the RIAA purportedly does),
false positives can be limited while maintaining the efficacy of the
technology. The human component is critical because of the burdens that
incorrect accusations of file-sharing can cause, such as shouldering the
cost of hiring defense lawyers or paying a settlement agreement.
C. ABUSE AND UNINTENDED SIDE EFFECTS
[38] Sometimes, even using accurate and effective technology to enforce
laws can be harmful due to unintended side effects. Some technologies
which aggregate data for ostensibly good uses can later be used to cause
harm. Discovering and using personal information to cause harm is
nothing new; in 1989, for example, actress Rebecca Schaeffer was shot at
her home by a stalker.66 He had found her by hiring a private investigator
to obtain her address from her California Motor Vehicle Record.67
Schaeffer’s death was an unintended and horrific result of a data-gathering
program. The government was not abusing its power, yet the existence
and accessibility of the information allowed someone else to cause harm.
[39] Information on driver’s licenses is not just being kept by
Departments of Motor Vehicles anymore. Businesses can also gain access
65

Id.
See John T. Cross, Age Verification in the 21st Century: Swiping Away Your Privacy,
23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 363, 370 (2005).
67
See EPIC DPPA and Driver’s License Privacy Page,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/drivers/ (last visited June 7, 2007). Following a series of
incidents like this, Congress passed the Drivers Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”) to
prevent the release of personal information “about any individual obtained by the
department in connection with a motor vehicle record . . .” although the statute includes
exceptions for disclosures “[f]or use by any licensed private investigative agency or
licensed security service for any purpose permitted under this subsection[,]” which is
precisely how Schaeffer’s stalker acquired her address. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(1), (b)(8)
(2000).
66
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to the information. Increasingly, states are issuing drivers licenses with a
magnetic strip or barcode which can be scanned.68 Some states encrypt
some of the data included on the licenses so they can only be used for law
enforcement purposes, but others do not.69 The included data can be
basic, such as a name, address, and license expiration date, or can be more
personal and distinctive, such as a social security number, electronic
fingerprint or signature image.70 Although many businesses scan driver’s
licenses to prevent underage patrons from purchasing tobacco or alcohol,
only a few states regulate what can be recorded or when licenses can be
swiped. In Texas, a business may not keep information obtained from a
scan in a database unless required to do so by the Texas alcohol
commission.71 New Hampshire entirely prohibits the swiping of licenses
to verify age.72 In Ohio, a business may store only a name, date of birth,

68

Cross, supra note 66, at 363-64. The current swipe-able state of driver’s licenses is a
far cry from the past, when many licenses did not even include pictures. However, the
use of driver’s licenses as positive identification instead of as mere licenses to drive a
motor vehicle was lost some time ago. In one particularly memorable anecdote, after
vetoing a bill to put photos on driver’s licenses twice, Tennessee Governor Lamar
Alexander visited the White House. When the guard asked him for a photo identification,
he replied, “We don't have them in Tennessee. I vetoed them.” The guard said, “You
can’t get in without one.’” Alexander was finally admitted when the Governor of
Georgia, who did have his photo on his driver’s license, vouched for Alexander’s
identity. Lamar Alexander, Much as I Hate It, We Need a National ID, WASH. POST,
Mar. 30, 2005, at A15.
69
Positive Access FAQs, http://www.positiveaccess.com/html/faqs.html (last visited June
7, 2007):
Some states and provinces have encrypted the ID data on their licenses
for various reasons of law enforcement control and/or individual
privacy protection. In several cases, these state’s [sic] with encrypted
data have released information to [legitimate scanning organizations]. .
. . [I]n [ ] other instances, the states maintain a strict policy of limiting
the release of encryption codes to law enforcement agencies.
70
See Swipe, http://www.we-swipe.us/research.html#info (last visited June 7, 2007).
71
TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 109.61(a)–(b) (Vernon 2004); see also Cross, supra
note 66, at 372–73 (discussing the statute in greater depth).
72
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:12(X) (2003) (“It shall be a misdemeanor for any person
to: (X) Knowingly scan, record, retain, or store in any electronic form or format, personal
information, as defined in RSA 260:14, obtained from any license, unless authorized by
the department.”); see also Cross, supra note 66, at 373–74 (discussing the statute in
greater depth).
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license expiration date, and license number.73 Similarly, Connecticut only
permits businesses to record patrons’ names, birthdates, license expiration
dates, and identification numbers.74 Other states apparently encourage the
use of license scanning devices. West Virginia, for instance, allows a
business to use the performance of a scan as an affirmative defense to
charges of selling alcohol or tobacco to a minor.75
[40] As so few states regulate the scanning of licenses by private
businesses, this use of technology to perfectly enforce the underage
drinking and tobacco use laws may have some significant unintended side
effects, such as violent crime.76 Many businesses automatically store
whatever information their scanners can decode.77 Scanner manufacturers
allow businesses to store scanned information in a local on-site database.78
A bar employee fairly easily could make a list of all customers’ home
addresses who were of a certain age and physical type.79 It would be easy

73

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.021(D)(1) (LexisNexis 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4301.61(D)(1) (LexisNexis 2003); see also Cross, supra note 66, at 374–78 (discussing
the statute in greater depth).
74
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-86(d)(1) (2003):
No permittee or permittee’s agent or employee shall electronically or
mechanically record or maintain any information derived from a
transaction scan, except the following: (A) The name and date of birth
of the person listed on the driver’s license or identity card presented by
a cardholder; (B) the expiration date and identification number of the
driver’s license or identity card resented by a cardholder;
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-344(e)(1) (2003):
No seller or seller’s agent or employee shall electronically or
mechanically record or maintain any information derived from a
transaction scan, except the following: (A) The name and date of birth
of the person listed on the driver’s license or identity card presented by
a cardholder; (B) the expiration date and identification number of the
driver’s license or identity card presented by a cardholder;
see also Cross, supra note 66, at 378–79 (discussing the statute in greater depth).
75
W. VA. CODE § 60-3A-25a (2004); see also Cross, supra note 66, at 381 (discussing
the statute in greater depth).
76
Cross, supra note 66, at 392.
77
Id.
78
Lee, supra note 2 (“[W]ith Intelli-Check’s scanners and those of many other
manufacturers, the information is stored locally, with the client gaining easy access.”).
79
See Kim Zetter, Great Taste, Less Privacy, WIRED, Feb. 6, 2004, available at
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2004/02/62182.
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to take advantage of the available information and use it towards
malicious ends.
[41] Data-gathering by well-intentioned governments can also lay the
groundwork for abuse by future governments. In Nazi Germany, South
Africa, and Rwanda, information about religion, ethnicity and tribal
affiliation, which was originally gathered with more innocent intentions,
was later used to facilitate genocide and apartheid.80 In Rwanda, race was
included on the national identification card a full sixty years before it
became a tool of genocide.81 Even if the government always remains a
good actor, the use of scanning devices could still allow vast quantities of
information about individuals to be stored and aggregated by private
individuals. There are no guarantees about what the future holds, so
governments and businesses should check themselves and their future
selves by avoiding unnecessary data collection.
[42] For those who believe alcohol and tobacco should be kept away from
minors, eliminating card swiping to prevent underage consumption would
be unfortunate. However, there are options which can minimize both
abuse and lawbreaking. As Eugene Volokh succinctly postulated, “it’s
important that the potential for abuse is limited and limitable. . . . Instead
of denying potentially useful tools to the police, we should think about
what control mechanisms we can set up to make abuse less likely.”82 In
this case, states could take greater measures to regulate what can be done
with scanned data and what can be stored. Perhaps disallowing any
information storage strikes the ideal balance, minimizing both underage
alcohol and tobacco use and the potential for abuse.
[43] Generally speaking, whether a technology should be used depends on
how easily abuse can be limited. In the case of scanning licenses,
increased regulation may be enough to prevent significantly dangerous
abuse; if no information is saved from a scan, the potential for abuse is
greatly diminished and much abuse simply cannot happen. However, the
80

Testimony of Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies, Cato Institute, to the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Will REAL ID Actually Make Us Safer? An
Examination of Privacy and Civil Liberties Concerns (May 8, 2007), available at
http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-jh20070508.html.
81
Id.
82
Volokh, supra note 8.
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use of racial information on the Rwandan national identification cards to
facilitate genocide raises an additional concern. Volokh notes that
in a legal and political system that relies heavily on
precedent and analogy, the slippery slope is a real risk. . . .
[For example,] once the government invests money in
[traffic] cameras, voters might want to get the most lawenforcement bang for the buck by having the police store,
merge, and analyze the gathered data. This slippage isn’t
certain, but it’s not implausible.83
Lawmakers and citizens must also be alert enough to curtail programs
where the potential for future abuse cannot be eliminated, even if the
immediate results are positive.
V. LEGAL CONCERNS
[44] A second set of concerns which arises when considering the wisdom
of perfect law enforcement are legal in nature. Even when law enforcing
technologies are effective, accurate, and abuse-proof, they may still be in
tension with the constitution or other important legal doctrines.
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PRIOR RESTRAINT
[45] Many software programs are being designed to prevent copyright
infringement. In cases of performance or copying of media, another term
for “prevention” could be “prior restraint of expression.” Courts generally
presume that restraining speech before it is uttered violates the First
Amendment, even when the speaker can be punished for the speech after it
is made.84 Of course, the First Amendment functions differently on
copyrighted works. Under the First Amendment, the government may not
prevent you from publishing a pamphlet, but under the Copyright Act, the
government may be employed to prevent others from publishing copies of

83
84

Id.
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 722–23 (1971).
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your pamphlet.85 Similarly, if you place a copyrighted music video on
youtube.com and claim that the video expresses your feelings much better
than you could using your own words, the video would undoubtedly be
speech.86 But you would also undoubtedly be liable for copying the video.
[46] Courts have historically been quick to dismiss First Amendment
claims in copyright suits.87 Perhaps the most popular and legally
successful view of the relationship between the First Amendment and
copyright is that of Robert Denicola and Melville Nimmer,88 who believe
that fair use,89 and the idea/expression distinction,90 provide enough limits

85

See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright
Has in Common With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
86
This example was originally given by Mark Tushnet in his Free Speech class, Dec. 5,
2006.
87
Tushnet, supra note 85, at 6; see also, e.g., Walt Disney Prods., v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d
751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[D]efendant's [First Amendment] claim can be dismissed
without a lengthy discussion . . . .”); NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Joint Hearing
on H.R. 2441 and S. 1284 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of
the House Judiciary Comm. and the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. (1995)
(statement of Bruce Lehman, Commissioner of Patents):
The First Amendment has always provided a completely different
standard with aregard to liability for actions that constitute speech as
compared to actions that constitute copyright infringement. They’re
really just apples and oranges. . . . [I]t really does a disservice to both
areas of law . . . to analogize from one to the other.
88
See Tushnet, supra note 85, at 6.
89
“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2000).
90

Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . . In
no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea . . . regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100–101 (1879) (“Where the
truths of a science or the methods of an art are the common property of the whole world,
any author has the right to express the one, or explain and use the other, in his own
way.”).
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on copyright to satisfy any concerns about free speech.91 Alternative
views include, for example, Rebecca Tushnet’s belief that some aspects of
copyright law may unnecessarily and unconstitutionally infringe on First
Amendment interests.92
[47] Although First Amendment issues rarely play a role in copyright
disputes, the disfavoring of prior restraints of expression in First
Amendment jurisprudence may still be relevant to perfect prevention of
copying. Even in copyright cases, courts have been reluctant to allow
copyright holders to prevent an expression from reaching an audience. In
Stewart v. Abend, for instance, Abend established he owned the renewal
rights in the copyrighted short story “It Had to Be Murder” and, by
extension, rights in the story’s derivative work, the movie Rear Window.93
Abend had sought an injunction against the ongoing distribution of the
movie, presumably so he could negotiate a very favorable royalty
agreement, but the Ninth Circuit ruled in Abend v. MCA, Inc. that
damages, fixed by the district court, should be awarded to him for the
continued distribution of the film.94 The remedy, which was in essence a
forced license, displays the court’s reluctance to allow someone the power
to prevent speech — where in this case, the speech was a film of
significant value.
[48] Saying that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Abend v. MCA, Inc.
demonstrates an implicit repudiation of prior restraint in copyright law
would be a drastic overstatement. The makers of Rear Window had
properly acquired the rights to make the film; the question of whether
Abend could enjoin the dissemination of the film only arose because
Cornell Woolrich, the author of “It Had to Be Murder,” died before the
copyright renewal period for the story had concluded.95 Dying without a
surviving spouse or child, the copyright reverted to a trust administered by

91

See Tushnet, supra note 85, at 6; see also Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free
Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283,
289–99 (1979); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1190 (1970).
92
See Tushnet, supra note 85, at 6, 27–30.
93
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 226- 27 (1990).
94
Abend v. MCA, 863 F.2d 1465, 1479–80 (9th Cir. 1988).
95
Id. at 1467.
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Woolrich’s executor, who sold it to Abend.96 Thus, the court’s decision
may have been motivated by the sense that the complications of copyright
renewals and reversions should not result in derivative works being held
hostage—perhaps especially not by individuals like Abend, who had no
relation to the creator of the original work. Nonetheless, Stewart v. Abend
demonstrates that there is some aversion to prior restraint in copyright,
perhaps one that could only grow to have teeth if significant copyright
reforms pass.
[49] Although the First Amendment does not currently protect against
perfect prevention of copying, the philosophy behind the prior restraint
doctrine may still be reason to eliminate the wide use of digital rights
management systems. Historically, many have argued that the certainty of
punishment in violating a prior restraint will have a greater “chilling
effect” on speech than post-speech criminal sanctions.97 Stephen Barnett
argued for the validity of the prior restraint doctrine because the
“collateral bar” rule prevents a speaker from challenging the constitutional
validity of an injunction on speech after the injunction has been
disobeyed.98
96

Id.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975).
Prior restraints fall on speech with a brutality and a finality all their
own. Even if they are ultimately lifted they cause irremediable loss —
a loss in the immediacy, the impact, of speech. They differ from the
imposition of criminal liability in significant procedural respects as
well, which in turn have their substantive consequences. The violator
of a prior restraint may be assured of being held in contempt; the
violator of a statute punishing speech criminally knows that he will go
before a jury, and may be willing to take his chance, counting on a
possible acquittal. A prior restraint, therefore, stops speech more
effectively. A criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes. Indeed it
is the hypothesis of the First Amendment that injury is inflicted on our
society when we stifle the immediacy of speech.
Id.
98
Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 551–53
(1977).
By virtue of [the collateral bar] rule, a newspaper or broadcast station
subject to a gag order is placed in a trilemma of chilling effects unique
to a prior restraint situation. It can comply with the order and take no
legal steps, thereby accepting the suppression. It can appeal the order
directly, but it must obey the interim restraint while it does so . . . . Or it
97
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[50] The “chilling effect” theory can be criticized if one believes that
injunctions will not restrain speech significantly more than criminal
sanctions. But in the context of copyright law, the use of digital rights
management systems has a chilling effect by its very nature. A copyright
holder employs DRM to prevent the copying of its work and to prevent the
dissemination of speech by preventing it from being uttered.99 The use of
DRM creates the opposite result of Stewart v. Abend. Abend was paid
damages for each instance of copyright infringement that occurred when
copies of Rear Window were sold or shown, but he could not prevent it
from being disseminated.100 On the other hand, DRM prevents copyright
infringing speech in the first instance.101 A potential copyright infringer
would not suffer the consequences of his actions by paying damages or
going to jail, but would be unable to infringe a copyright at all.102
[51] Why might this be problematic? Could one not see DRM as saving
the court system and copyright owners a lot of time and money that would
have been spent trying to punish copyright infringers? A potential
problem can be analogized from a traditional First Amendment scenario.
Consider a situation similar to New York Times Co. v. United States,
where a reporter has a government secret in his possession that he would
be punished for publishing.103 In our hypothetical system of perfect
prevention, the reporter would not be able to publish the material at all.
However, without perfect prevention, the reporter has a choice: do nothing
and avoid punishment, or publish the secret and be sanctioned. The
reporter has to weigh, in effect, what the secret is worth to the public
against the value of his own freedom or finances. People being the selfinterested beings that they are, one would expect this heuristic balancing

can publish in the face of the gag order, but only at the price of
forfeiting its legal and constitutional objections to the order and thus, in
all probability, embracing a contempt conviction.
Id. at 553.
99
See Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use,
20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 60 (2006).
100
Abend v. MCA, 863 F.2d 1465, 1480 (9th Cir. 1988).
101
See Armstrong, supra note 99, at 60.
102
See id.
103
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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to result in secrets important to the public good being revealed and secrets
that are merely titillating or prurient being held back.104
[52] In the copyright context, the reporter is replaced with an aspiring
copyright infringer—a character for whom one typically has less esteem
but whose role may be similarly important. The aspiring infringer does
not trade in secrets and rhetoric but in culture, most of which is legally
available for a fee. The aspiring infringer performs a similar balancing
test as the reporter, asking if the value of the infringement (both to the
public and to the infringer) is outweighed by the cost of being caught.
However, unlike in the government secret scenario, fewer would be
willing to accept this balancing test as justified, primarily because it is so
difficult to think of how a copyright infringement could be vitally
important to society.
[53] However, there are and have been situations when perfect prevention
of infringement might have been unfortunate. Consider, for example, the
infamous Star Wars Holiday Special105 and the critically-acclaimed Grey
Album.106
[54] The Star Wars Holiday Special was a two-hour television special
broadcast in its entirety in the United States only once on Friday,
104

This argument is similar to the equilibrium argument proposed in Bickel’s A Morality
of Consent. Bickel argued that, while the government is entitled to keep things private,
the government’s power would be frightening if it were not offset by the power of the
press. The value of the government’s privacy and the public discourse are irreconcilable,
and so a balance is struck by the struggle. BICKEL, supra note 97, at 79–82. But see Cass
Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889, 901–02, 904 (1986):
[Bickel’s] equilibrium theory is vulnerable because it does not address.
..
....
the actual incentives of the press and government; the respective power
of the countervailing forces; and what the proper baseline for
evaluating outcomes should be…[The] equilibrium theory [is]
impressionistic and relies on premises that are both unsupported and
unlikely.
105
For more information, see Star Wars Holiday Special,
http://www.starwarsholidayspecial.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
106
See DJ Dangermouse – The Grey Album Download, http://www.illegalart.org/audio/grey.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
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November 17, 1978.107 David Hofstede, author of What Were They
Thinking?: The 100 Dumbest Events in Television History, ranked the
holiday special at number one and called it “the worst two hours of
television ever.”108 It is rumored that Star Wars creator George Lucas
once said: “[i]f I had the time and a hammer, I would track down every
copy of that program and smash it.”109 Unfortunately for George Lucas,
the special has achieved a cult status because VHS and Betamax
recordings of the broadcast have been copied.110
[55] The Grey Album, on the other hand, was a “critically praised”111
collection arranged by Brian Burton (better known as D.J. Dangermouse)
which mixed tracks from Jay-Z’s The Black Album and the Beatles’ White
Album.112 Burton complied with notice by White Album rights holder
EMI to cease and desist distribution of the album, but Burton’s fans were
not so conciliatory.113 They staged “Grey Tuesday,” during which more
than 150 sites offered the album for download.114 While Burton
theoretically could have purchased a license from EMI to use the White
107

L. Wayne Hicks, When the Force Was a Farce,
http://www.tvparty.com/70starwars.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2008).
108
DAVID HOFSTEDE, WHAT WERE THEY THINKING?: THE 100 DUMBEST EVENTS IN
TELEVISION HISTORY 204 (2004).
109
See L. Wayne Hicks, When the Force Was a Farce,
http://www.tvparty.com/70starwars.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2008).
110
See, e.g., Star Wars Holiday Special, http://www.starwarsholidayspecial.com (last
visited June 12, 2007):
This site was created as a labor of love in homage to the 25th
anniversary of The Star Wars Holiday Special, which aired one time
only on November 17th, 1978 and has been virtually lost ever since.
The intent was to gather as much as there is to possibly know about the
Holiday Special and document it in great detail, since this has never
really been done before.
Star Wars Holiday Special!, http://www.i-mockery.com/minimocks/starwars-holiday (last
visited June 12, 2007); Stomp Tokyo Video Reviews — Star Wars Holiday Special,
http://www.stomptokyo.com/movies/star-wars-holiday-special.html (last visited June 12,
2007).
111
See, e.g., Dangermouse News,
http://www.dangermousesite.com/news_weekly_best.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007)
(highlighting the Grey Album’s praise from Entertainment Weekly).
112
Bill Werde, Defiant Downloads Rise from Underground, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004 at
E3.
113
Id.
114
Id.
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Album, the Beatles do not typically allow their work to be sampled even
for a fee.115 EMI did not file suit, despite their initial protests against the
album.116
[56] Both the Grey Album and the Star Wars Holiday Special are serious
examples of an aspiring infringer’s dilemma. Is it worth risking a possible
lawsuit in order to copy significant pieces of culture which are
contraband?
In the present world which generally lacks perfect
prevention, the Star Wars Holiday Special and the Grey Album are
tolerated. The owners of the special do not want to go through the effort
to prevent its dissemination and preservation, most likely because they just
do not care enough to do so and because they do not wish to draw any
further attention to the show. EMI may have backed down in the face of
the widespread disobedience and anger that destroying the Grey Album
would create. However, in a world of perfect prevention, an infringer
could not practice the “civil disobedience” that the Star Wars Holiday
Special and the Grey Album require to persist, and perhaps the world
would have significantly less rich speech and cultural landmarks. There
would be no uses to tolerate. Potentially valuable pieces of speech or
culture such as mash-ups could disappear. Although the law does not
currently recognize this concern under the purview of the First
Amendment, a belief that speech and media should be preserved and
disseminated should still prevent policymakers from facilitating powerful
means of perfect prevention.
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FAIR USE
[57] A more significant First Amendment issue could be raised if courts
come to fully accept Denicola and Nimmer’s belief that fair use, along
with the idea/expression distinction, saves the copyright statute from being
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.117 Although fair use is an
affirmative defense to copyright infringement,118 many digital rights
115

Id. (“To create a collection like ‘The Grey Album’ legally, an artist would first have to
get permission to use copyrighted material. . . . Many artists, however, like the Beatles,
will not allow their music to be sampled.”)
116
DJ Dangermouse – The Grey Album Download, http://www.illegalart.org/audio/grey.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
117
See Denicola, supra note 91, at 289–99; Nimmer, supra note 91, at 1190.
118
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599 (1994).
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management technologies prevent copying which would be fair use
because they prevent all instances of copying. Additional barriers to fair
use copying have been erected since the passage of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”). Section 1201 of the Copyright Act states, “No
person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title.”119
[58] Although section 1201 provides some limited exceptions to this
rule,120 it does not include a general exception for fair use. Section 1201
seems to say that, so long as a copyright holder can conceal material
behind a “technological measure that effectively controls access”121 to the
copyrighted work, the copyright holder can legally eliminate fair use of
that work.
[59]
Perfect prevention of arguably fair uses does raise some
constitutional concerns. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court embraced
Denicola and Nimmer’s view, stating that although copyrights are not
categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment,
copyright law’s built-in free speech safeguards, such as fair use and the
idea/expression distinction,122 are adequate to address First Amendment
concerns so long as Congress does not alter the “traditional contours of
copyright protection . . . .”123 Other courts have also implied that fair use
119
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saves the copyright regime from being a First Amendment violation.124
Thus, section 1201 runs the risk of being unconstitutional under the First
Amendment on the basis that it effectively makes fair use of a work illegal
if one must circumvent technology to access it.
[60] Despite Eldred’s statement that fair use prevents the Copyright Act
from violating the First Amendment, other cases postulate that the First
Amendment provides very little protection for fair use. In Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 125 for instance, the Second Circuit held that the
DMCA,126 was constitutional even though the law effectively eliminated
fair uses when copyrighted content was protected by DRM
technologies.127 Corley was enjoined from posting the DeCSS code on his
website, a code which allows a person to circumvent CSS, an encryption
code that prevents the unauthorized viewing and copying of DVDs.128 On
appeal to the Second Circuit, Corley argued, among other points, that he
should be allowed to post the DeCSS code because the DMCA violated
the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause by unduly obstructing the
“fair use” of copyrighted materials.129
[61] Although the Second Circuit did not fully “explore the extent to
which fair use might have constitutional protection, grounded on either the
Constitutionalization of Fair Use, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 95 (2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=991354.
124
See, e.g., A & M Records v. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(“[F]ree speech concerns are protected by and coextensive with the fair use doctrine.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001); L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1472 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(holding that free speech concerns “are subsumed within the fair use Analysis”); see also
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (noting
“the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction
between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude
for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use . . . .”); Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (“From the infancy of copyright protection,
some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to
fulfill copyright's very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . .
.’”) (omission in original).
125
Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998).
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Corley, 273 F.3d at 458.
128
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First Amendment or the Copyright Clause . . .”130 because it was beyond
the scope of the lawsuit, the court nonetheless noted in dicta, “[w]e know
of no authority for the proposition that fair use, as protected by the
Copyright Act, much less the Constitution, guarantees copying by the
optimum method or in the identical format of the original.”131 Thus, while
the DMCA and CSS may prevent someone from making a digital copy of
a DVD to, for example, make a documentary for a film class, a fair user
would be able to “point[] a camera, a camcorder, or a microphone at a
monitor as it displays the DVD movie.”132 In other words, according to
the Second Circuit, even if fair use were constitutionally protected, the
type or form of the fair use could be severely limited.
[62] Even if fair use were not constitutionally protected at all, its value
should lead policymakers to question the wisdom of the DMCA and the
use of DRM technologies which prohibit all instances of copying.
Preventing fair use copies is similar to a surveillance system which
experiences too many false positives. The technology may perfectly catch
all law violations, but it catches too much, to the detriment and
inconvenience of those in the “false positive” group (fair use copiers) and
of all potential and actual fair users. Policymakers must ask if the benefit
of perfect enforcement—eliminating media “piracy”133—is offset by the
cost of preventing fair uses of the media. After Eldred, however, there is
significant reason to believe passing laws that prevent fair uses could
violate the First Amendment.
C. THE NECESSITY DEFENSE
[63] Another concern about perfect prevention is that sometimes it is
important to break the law to prevent harm. At times, exceptions to laws
are written into statutes explicitly. For example, several statutes making
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murder a crime include an explicit exception for self-defense.134
Similarly, the Copyright Act includes an exception for “fair uses” of the
copyrighted material.135 At other times, exceptions are not explicit in a
statute, but are nevertheless recognized by potential litigants, such as
breaking the speed limit to tear away from danger.
[64] Simply, there are times when it is ethical and imperative to break the
law. Amongst ourselves, we may disagree about precisely when these
situations arise, but most reasonable people would agree that there are
times when the law does not anticipate the bizarre states of affairs that can
arise and make lawbreaking necessary. This reality has been woven into
our jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has recognized “necessity” as a
defense to criminal prosecution in situations where “criminal action was
necessary to avoid a harm more serious than that sought to be prevented
by the statute defining the offense.”136 This defense probably exists even
when no exception is explicitly recognized in a criminal statute.137 The
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rationale for the rule places great faith in individual judgment; as the Ninth
Circuit said,
In some sense, the necessity defense allows us to act as
individual legislatures, amending a particular criminal
provision or crafting a one-time exception to it, subject to
court review, when a real legislature would formally do the
same under those circumstances. For example, by allowing
prisoners who escape a burning jail to claim the
justification of necessity, we assume the lawmaker,
confronting this problem, would have allowed for an
exception to the law proscribing prison escapes.138
[65] In a system of “perfect prevention,” technology could remove the
ability to break laws in situations where the necessity defense would be
applicable. Here, as when we considered prior restraints on speech,
preventing a law from being broken has a different effect than punishing a
lawbreaker after the fact. In cases where a necessity defense could be
used, whether or not an individual can break a law is critical. There is a
need to break the law to avoid some greater ill, and so whether the law is
broken determines whether the ill was averted. Any technology which
prevents law breaking before the fact—for example, one which could
prevent cars from exceeding the speed limit—risks creating harm by
failing to allow for situations where law breaking is necessary. The use of
such technology should be avoided in all cases lacking extremely powerful
countervailing factors.
D. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
[66] Using technology to search computers connected to the Internet has
the potential to violate the Fourth Amendment. These issues arise not
because of the “perfect” nature of the enforcement, but rather because of
context of federal criminal statutes that do not provide for it in so many
words.
Id. at 501 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting majority opinion) (citing Bailey, 444 U.S. at
415). In the recent Ninth Circuit decision Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850 (2007), the
court stated, “We do not believe that the Oakland Cannabis dicta abolishes more than a
century of common law necessity jurisprudence.”
138
United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196–97 (9th Cir. 1991).

31

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 4

the types of surveillance technologies which are likely to be used to
monitor the activities of web surfers and personal computer users.
[67] Personal computing software and appliances are increasingly
“tethered,” that is able to relay or receive information from their
manufacturers.139 A TiVo knows whether it frequently watches PBS or
Comedy Central and can send this information back to TiVo, Inc.140 This
is how we know that Janet Jackson’s “wardrobe malfunction” during the
2004 Super Bowl was replayed three times more than any other moment
during the Super Bowl Broadcast.141 Because many computers are
perpetually connected to the Internet, many software programs such as
operating systems and antivirus programs are designed to automatically
update themselves.142 Automatic updates change or add code to an
individual computer. While most updates are desirable and useful, there is
nothing to stop an update from adding code which will search a
computer’s files and documents or turn on the computer’s microphone or
camera.143
[68] Tethered appliances make it possible for law enforcement and others
to perform searches without any obvious intrusion. The police do not
have to break down front doors to search through photo albums looking
for obscenity; they do not even have to physically place a wiretap outside
of a home. If there is software on someone’s computer which will do it,
law enforcement could search that person’s hard drive and send a report
on what was found without that person ever being aware of the search.
[69] When, if ever, would such searches raise a Fourth Amendment issue?
The answer depends on how the searching software was installed on a
139
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computer. If the software is installed voluntarily and the user is informed
that the information it collects may be shared with government authorities,
then the Fourth Amendment is unlikely to be activated because the user
consented to the search. If the software provider has a privacy policy that
promises not to share found information, the situation also probably will
not raise a Fourth Amendment issue. While laws designed to protect
privacy may be activated by a private company sharing information about
its clients, the Fourth Amendment likely would not be at issue. Fourth
Amendment case law indicates there is no constitutional problem with the
government acting on information gathered from third parties who came
by the information voluntarily.144 “[T]he law gives no protection to the
wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent . . . .”145
[70] A particularly relevant situation implicating the Fourth Amendment
in computer searches was discussed by Michael Adler in his note
“Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband.”146 Adler asked
whether there would be a Fourth Amendment issue with what he called a
“perfect search,” an “automated, wide-scale search that could
hypothetically scan through hundreds of millions of files but would report
to authorities only the presence of files containing contraband.”147 Such a
search would be without consent— the code which allowed the search
would have to have been installed without the computer user’s
knowledge—and would be designed to find digital contraband such as
illegally copied media, child pornography, or other obscenity.148 The
search program would ignore other material on the computer, even if it
were illegal or scandalous, and would not be tempted to peek at other
information as a human investigator would.149 In other words, although
the searches would take place “dragnet-style”—without probable cause or
any particular reason to think a given computer contained any
contraband—the searches would (in Adler’s hypothetical) produce no
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false positives, have virtually no impact on property, and be virtually
unnoticeable by the computer user.150
[71] Prima facie, such a search would appear to violate the Fourth
Amendment if performed without a warrant. In the seminal Supreme
Court decision of Katz v. United States, Justice Stewart explained, “[w]hat
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, must be
constitutionally protected.”151 People generally expect their digital copies
of pictures and documents to be as private as those they keep in a file
cabinet in their home. After Katz, the Fourth Amendment’s applicability
would appear certain.
[72] Two cases following Katz bring this certainty into doubt. In United
States v. Place, the Court found that a dog sniffing luggage for narcotics
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.152 Because the sniff did not
require opening the luggage and exposing non-contraband items, the
information revealed was limited to the revelation of contraband and did
not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.153 Some courts initially read
the Place decision to rest on the fact that odors presumably diffused
outside of the bags and thus were publicly accessible.154 However, the
Court emphasized in United States v. Jacobson that the decisive fact in
Place was that “government conduct . . . could reveal nothing about noncontraband items.”155 In Jacobson, federal agents tested a sample of white
powder which had been accidentally discovered and, while destroying the
sample, verified that it was cocaine.156
The Court explained,
“governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is
[contraband], and no other arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no
150
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legitimate privacy interest.”157 Thus, police may search for contraband
without a warrant so long as the search “could, at most, have only a de
minimus impact on any protected property interest.”158
[73] Under Place and Jacobson, it would seem that a “perfect search”
might get a constitutional free pass so long as the proper safeguards
against abuse were put in place. However, the Court has recently adopted
a more restrictive attitude towards new ways of searching. In Kyllo v.
United States, the Supreme Court considered whether law enforcement
agents could use a thermal imaging device to detect infrared radiation
from high-intensity lamps typically used to grow marijuana indoors.159
The majority held, without addressing Place or Jacobson, that when “the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.”160
[74] What Kyllo means for the constitutionality of the “perfect search” is
unclear. The thermal imagers in Kyllo were not directly searching for
contraband, but rather for legal property—the heat lamps—which is a
strong indication of contraband. The search revealed something more than
the presence of contraband: it revealed the presence of heat lamps, an
arguably private fact. Thermal searches might sidestep the Jacobson
exception to the warrant requirement without the Kyllo decision having an
impact on the constitutionality of a “perfect search.”
[75] On the other hand, while a theoretically perfect search might be
captured by the Place-Jacobson exception, even the best written searching
programs might reveal more than is constitutionally acceptable under
Place and Jacobson. Consider that any program would have to install
itself on the computer it was searching, creating the possibility of
interrupting or affecting another program’s functioning. Further, the
program would have to reveal nothing other than the presence of
contraband, even private information that is not usually considered
157
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sensitive, such as the operating system a person is using. Any surveillance
program that could actually be written might be revealing or risk injuring
property (i.e. other computer programs) and thus fall outside the PlaceJacobson exception.
[76] The constitutionality of a perfect search, therefore, may depend on
the specifics of the search program itself. Yet, the risk of affecting other
aspects of a person’s computer may be enough to make all such searches
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
VI. PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS
[77] Logistical and legal concerns aside, there are numerous philosophical
and public policy reasons to resist the use of technology to facilitate law
enforcement.
A. LAW ENFORCEMENT IS MEANT TO BE DISCRETIONARY
[78] One of the most significant reasons to oppose perfect enforcement is
precisely because it would catch all instances of lawbreaking. Perfect
enforcement of existing laws will not create ideal results, as our laws were
written and developed to reflect a world where law enforcement was
imperfect or discretionary. Furthermore, for a rule to be enforced
perfectly using technology, the rule must be expressed concisely to a
computer or similar device; there is no room for a concept as complex as
fair use. Such simple expressions of rules will almost necessarily be poor
expressions of what behavior is actually desirable.
[79] Historically, laws have not been written or developed with perfect
enforcement in mind. Private law or civil action requires one party to
bring suit against another; as this takes time, money, and effort and is a
strain on relationships, many potential suits are never brought. Similarly,
prosecutors have virtually unlimited discretion over what particular crimes
to prosecute. As a result, people often get away with petty law violations
such as trespassing in a park after dark, driving five miles over the speed
limit, or committing a noise violation in a residential neighborhood. A
person can talk his way out of a speeding ticket if he is speeding to the
hospital to see a very ill relative. Even law violations that are considered
more serious such as prostitution or drug possession often go unpunished
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due to a lack of resources in the legal system; a prosecutor simply does not
have the means and time to try to prosecute every case.
[80] Imperfect application of the law occurs not only because of choice or
lack of means to enforce. A law cannot be written to perfectly reflect the
goals of its author or authors. This idea has been explored by Frederick
Schauer. He explained that most prescriptive rules such as laws are
“probabilistic generalizations.”161 That is to say, most rules are created
because following them probabilistically effects some goal. Consider the
hypothetical rules “no dogs allowed,” “speed limit 55,” “no one under the
age of 21 shall consume alcohol” or “thou shalt not kill.”162 All of these
rules exist because of some justification—that parks and restaurants
should be clean and quiet, that people should be safe on the roads, that
irresponsible individuals should not drink, that people should live.
[81]
Probabilistically speaking, following the rules effects these
outcomes. Not permitting dogs in a park will usually make a park quieter
and cleaner; driving under fifty-five miles per hour is generally safe;
creating a minimum drinking age generally diminishes irresponsible
drinking; preventing murder keeps people alive. A rule’s factual predicate
bears a probabilistic relationship to the concerns of the rule, but in
particular cases the connection between the justification and the
consequence is absent.163 Indeed, rules are almost always both over and
under inclusive.164 For example, when the roads are slippery, it may be
dangerous to drive at fifty or even forty miles per hour.165 When many
cars are all driving slightly above the speed limit, it may be dangerous to
drive below the speed limit.166 Many under twenty-one can drink
responsibly, and many individuals over the age of twenty-one cannot.167
Certainly, in many cases, lawmakers recognize that rules are over and
under inclusive, but opt for rules instead of standards because they are
easier to apply. Lawmakers know that when they are preventing twenty
year olds from drinking, they are preventing some responsible twenty year
161
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olds from imbibing and allowing some irresponsible thirty year olds to
cause a ruckus in the local bar. Nonetheless, the rule “you must be
twenty-one to drink” is much easier to apply and administer than a system
which requires an individualized assessment of everyone’s maturity.
Rules also make it easier for individuals to understand what the law
requires; for example, an individual can much more easily judge if he is
driving over fifty-five miles per hour than he can judge if he is driving
“safely.”
[82] For these reasons, rules are enforced even though we acknowledge
they sometimes reach those they should not. Even so, there are still
exceptional circumstances that are not written into law but which the legal
system is often willing to accept as an excuse for breaking a rule. Consider
H. L. A. Hart’s famous example of a rule that forbids one to take a vehicle
into a public park.168 Lon Fuller argued that forbidding a statue of a
vehicle in the park—say, an old tank on a pedestal placed to
commemorate a war—was inconsistent with any sensible purpose behind
the “no vehicles in the park” rule.169 Ignoring the jurisprudential questions
of what a judge should do if actually faced with the question of whether
the tank should be allowed in the park, one can safely note that it is very
unlikely anyone would even try to enforce the “no vehicles in the park”
law against whomever was trying to erect the statue, in part because in this
case the connection between the consequence of erecting the statute and
the justification behind the rule (noisy motors or dangerous machines in
the park are unpleasant) is wholly lacking.
[83] These kinds of law violations which no one complains about are very
common in copyright law. Violators who photocopy their favorite poems
or stories are not hunted down. Sometimes, copyright violations are
allowed to continue unimpeded because the copyright infringer has a
plausible “fair-use” defense to the infringement.170 Even though a fair use
defense may not succeed, the likelihood that it will may be enough to
168
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make a copyright holder unwilling to go through the effort of bringing
suit. Sometimes, copyright violations that are clearly illegal but which
generate publicity are ignored by copyright holders as well—what Tim
Wu calls “tolerated uses.”171 Wu notes that “[t]he industry is deeply
conflicted about mild forms of piracy — trapped somewhere between its
pathological hatred of ‘pirates’ and its lust for the buzz piracy can
build.”172 Tolerating these infringements is, essentially, utility
maximizing. Those who infringe are let off the hook, and content
providers get more notice.
[84] Enforcing laws perfectly eliminates this discretion. Software which
prevents copyright infringement prevents not only fair uses of copyrighted
material but also utility-maximizing illegal uses which might have been
tolerated. Further, as commentators have snidely observed, “[u]nless
DRM [Digital Rights Management] systems include a ‘judge on a chip,’
they will remain incapable of determining whether a user is copying part
of a work for purposes of piracy or parody.”173 Until recently, a copyright
owner had to affirmatively act to punish a copyright violation. Now, using
DRM, copyright owners can prevent many more violations. The problem
with perfect enforcement is that, figuratively speaking, it prevents or
punishes the placement of a tank statue in a park. Not only are fair and
tolerated uses curtailed, not only does the woman speeding to the hospital
get a ticket, but violations of the law that are clearly justified but which we
cannot anticipate are prevented or punished.
B. THE INHERENT VALUE OF PRIVACY
[85] Among the most difficult to articulate aversions to perfect law
enforcement is the sense that enforcement methods violate privacy.
Lillian BeVier wrote, “[p]rivacy is a chameleon-like word, used
denotatively to designate a wide range of wildly disparate interests—from
confidentiality of personal information to reproductive autonomy—and
connotatively to generate goodwill on behalf of whatever interest is being
171
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asserted in its name.”174 Several commentators, notably William L.
Prosser175 and more recently, David J. Solove,176 have attempted to give
the concept a more rigorous definition by providing a taxonomy of the
various interests the word “privacy” can denote. The instantiation of
privacy invasion which perfect enforcement implicates is that which
Prosser called “intrusion upon [one’s] seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs”177 and what Solove identified as “surveillance”178 and
“intrusion.”179 Intrusion differs from surveillance in that it need not
involve the gathering of information; rather, the harm of intrusion is its
interference with solitude, or one’s ability to retreat from the presence of
others.180
[86] With these types of privacy invasions in mind, one can ask if there is
an inherent value in privacy—freedom from surveillance and intrusion,
even if one has nothing to hide, even nothing to be embarrassed about—
which could be threatened by various technologies. Certainly, being
stared at for extended periods of time can be “invasive and penetrating and
also disturbing, frightening, and disruptive.”181 But these feelings of
discomfort lack substance; they do not seem strong when compared to
arguments that cameras decrease crime and traffic accidents and that
searches of computer files are necessary to discover and destroy child
pornography rings. If one has nothing to fear from surveillance, can an
interest in privacy ever trump a legitimate policy interest in preventing
crime and injury?
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[87] Philosopher Thomas Nagel has made progress in giving substance to
these kinds of privacy interests, specifically arguing that it is necessary for
individuals to have privacy in order to maintain both a public and private
identity. According to Nagel, what we seek when we seek privacy is
concealment, and “[c]oncealment includes not only secrecy and deception,
but also reticence and nonacknowledgment.”182 Reticence and
nonacknowledgment are not dishonest. Often, all know the concealed
truth. Rather, reticence and nonacknowledgment maintain social order,
comfort and respect, and avoid conflict.183 Nagel offered the example of
two individuals, A and B, at a cocktail party.184 A recently published a
terrible review of B’s book.185 Neither of them acknowledges this; rather
they talk stiffly about politics and real estate.186 But, consider the
alternative, A announcing, “You conceited fraud, I handled you with kid
gloves in that review; if I’d said what I really thought it would have been
unprintable; the book made me want to throw up — and it’s by far your
best.”187 B knows that A thinks this, but would rather be spared the
experience of being faced with the cruel comments.188
[88] Similarly, consider two friends or public figures who are known for
being emotional and who are going through a bitter divorce. Everyone
may know that they have had vitriolic arguments and said hateful things;
perhaps the two individuals have acknowledged that this is the case. But,
having others read the transcript or hear a recording of these arguments,
even if they are precisely as imagined, is degrading and uncomfortable for
the two arguers. It is the exposure itself which causes a concrete injury,
even if what is exposed is not a secret.
[89] Reticence and nonacknowledgment are thus useful, but they are
exercised at a cost. The book reviewer is very conscientious about not
saying what he thinks; the divorcees refrain from sharing their thoughts
with most people they encounter each day. And, just as one needs to
182

THOMAS NAGEL, CONCEALMENT AND EXPOSURE: AND OTHER ESSAYS 3, 4 (Oxford
University Press 2002).
183
Id. at 9-10.
184
Id. at 11.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.

41

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 4

physically relax after standing all day, these individuals must also relax by
turning off their performance in private or with confidants.
[90]
Surveillance pressures one to exercise reticence and
nonacknowlegment more often, creating tension between the need to put
forth a polite and socially acceptable persona and the need to act without
consideration for social norms in private. Knowing that someone has
filmed one driving, is scanning one’s computer files, or is keeping tabs on
what television one watches has subtle effects on a person’s actions. One
may hesitate to rock out to Britney Spears in the car or to TiVo terrible
soap operas while at work. The fear that someone else has seen a silly,
personal moment or habit, even if no concrete harm can come of the
exposure, is chilling. Thus, as Julie Cohen notes, surveillance “threatens
not only to chill the expression of eccentric individuality, but also,
gradually, to dampen the force of our aspirations to it.”189 This may well
be true, but one is right to ask if the mere dampening of eccentricities is
enough to limit measures which could end excessively harmful child
pornography, deadly traffic accidents, and even terrorist plotting. Nagel
argues,
The public gaze is inhibiting because, except for infants
and psychopaths, it brings into effect expressive constraints
and requirements of self-presentation that are strongly
incompatible with the natural expression of strong or
intimate feeling. And it presents us with a demand to
justify ourselves before others that we cannot meet for
those things that we cannot put a good face on. The
management of one’s inner life and one’s private demons is
a personal task and should not be made to answer to
standards broader than necessary.190
In essence, Nagel argues that without privacy in which to deal with
socially inappropriate inclinations or strong emotions, we would lose our
ability to function appropriately (i.e. to exercise nonacknowledgment and
reticence) in public and cause social breakdown.
189
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[91] To those concerned with privacy and discretion, Cohen and Nagel’s
worries seem justified. For others, the effects they warn of sound alarmist.
Since the first season of Survivor on CBS, reality television has gained
such popularity that thousands clamor to be featured on programs that
openly seek to embarrass and expose raw emotions and loud, petty
conflicts. Britain’s closed circuit television (“CCTV”) network of over
four million public surveillance cameras is widely perceived as “a friendly
eye in the sky, not Big Brother but a kindly and watchful uncle or aunt.”191
Even Nagel acknowledges that “what is hidden and what is not may be
arbitrary.”192 Indeed, the nature of publicly acceptable behavior has
changed over centuries and differs across cultures. The current popularity
of blogs and reality television and the non-reaction to Britain’s CCTV
system indicates that the degree of privacy one needs may be somewhat
elastic.
[92] Nonetheless, the writers of blogs and the cast of reality series are
volunteers, and British citizens being monitored by CCTV are already
subjected to the human public’s gaze. More importantly, computers and
cameras eventually turn off, and the British pedestrian eventually returns
to the privacy of her own home. These individuals still maintain privacy
because they, like everyone else, need it in some degree. Nagel argues,
“we need privacy to be allowed to conduct ourselves in extremis in a way
that serves purely individual demands, the demands of strong personal
emotion.”193 And he is correct. Most people would go mad if the paparazzi
followed them around and eavesdropped on their every conversation or if
video cameras were placed inside every person’s home. But if the human
need for privacy is somewhat elastic, the risk of harm in other cases may
be harder to assess. Does Nagel’s argument also undermine the rationales
for traffic cameras or computer document searches?
[93] As computers become more deeply woven into people’s lives, the
notion of searching computer files seems only marginally less invasive
than sticking a camera in someone’s home. Increasingly, pictures, diaries,
and financial information are being stored electronically. Individuals’
191
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private selves are often as much embodied in their personal computers as
in their file cabinets and leather-bound journals, and so Nagel’s argument
is about as persuasive for computer searches as it is for in-home cameras.
[94] Whether the presence of public cameras is an unjustified privacy
invasion is less clear. Red light and speeding cameras are only placed in
locations which are already in public, where one can already be seen. The
greater permanence of the camera’s recording may incline a person to
restrain her eccentricities more than usual, but publicly placed cameras
may be the kind of privacy invasion to which humans can adapt.
[95] The degree of harm surveillance causes thus depends on what
technology is being used and where the surveillance is occurring.194
Society and individuals’ interests in avoiding these harms are relevant
even when an invasive technology is being used successfully to enforce
laws that all agree with, for, as Nagel argues, society cannot function
without sufficient space to be one’s private self.
C. BALANCE OF GOVERNMENT AND INDIVIDUAL POWER
[96] A final concern is that using technology to enforce laws will
unwisely shift power to the government and from the individual. This
notion of a “balance of power” between the government and its citizens is
evoked in the Second Amendment.195 Its meaning, concerning the “right
of the people to keep and bear arms,”196 has undergone much
consideration. While most federal appellate courts have stated that the
amendment is a “collective right” that only protects the private possession
of weapons in connection to the function of a state citizen’s militia,197 the
194
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D.C. Circuit has recently joined the Fifth Circuit and a number of state
courts in holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s
right to keep and bear arms.198 One rationale for allowing individuals to
keep firearms is to maintain the people’s ability to resist tyrannical
government.199 In order to prevent abuse of government power, one might
believe not only in separation and balance of powers among the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches, but also in the need for a
balance of power between the government and the people themselves.
This sentiment is present not only in some interpretations of the Second
Amendment, but also in the limited powers of Congress200 and in the
Tenth Amendment.201
[97] Just as forbidding individuals from possessing firearms shifts power
in favor of the government, using technology to enforce laws also shifts
the balance of power between the government and the individual.
Historically, the government has been made up of individuals, all of whom
had to be willing to participate in law enforcement actions. To issue a
speeding ticket, a police officer needed to pull over the speeding car, write
the ticket, and appear in court if the ticket was challenged. This effort was
roughly commensurate with the inconvenience to the driver of having to
wait to receive the ticket and appear in court to challenge it.
[98] When a camera automatically issues tickets without an element of
human discretion, however, the balance of power is shifted. The
government trivially exerts its power—no one even has to look at the
tickets as they are being mailed out. The alleged perpetrator receives a
ticket in the mail, stating that some amount must be paid or the perpetrator
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must show up in court. In court, the evidence is the photographs or the
video; a police officer need not take the time out of his day to testify as to
what he saw. Similarly, the RIAA could choose to send notice and
takedown letters automatically with minimal human oversight if their web
crawlers became more accurate.202 The provider of the allegedly
infringing content would have to explain that the use of copyrighted
material was fair, that there was some mistake, or that the material was
accessed under one of the DMCA’s exceptions.203
[99] The procedural safeguards of the court system may provide some
insulation from this imbalance. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for
instance, recently struck down a red light camera program as being in
conflict with Minnesota state law, which preempts Minnesota traffic
laws.204 Under the ordinance describing the camera program, the owner of
a car caught speeding was presumptively guilty of a misdemeanor.205
However, Minnesota law provided that a defendant be “presumed innocent
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”206 The problem, the
court explained, was that the presumption that the owner was the driver
eliminated the presumption of innocence and shifted the burden of proof
from the government to the defendant.207 As a result of the decision, even
if the cameras continue to be used, the government’s power to prosecute
traffic violations will be diminished and closer to the power of individuals
in defensive postures.
[100] While courts may correct certain shifts in the balance of power,
other government initiatives may be more difficult to challenge. In The
Company v. United States, a company that provides an OnStar-like
202
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system208 for cars anonymously brought suit, objecting to the FBI’s use of
the system to eavesdrop on suspected criminals.209 The FBI had not
merely eavesdropped on telephone conversations using the system, but
rather had remotely reprogrammed the microphone so all conversations in
the car could be overheard.210 The company believed they were not
legally required to comply with the district court order to allow
eavesdropping.211 If the company had not objected, there may not have
been a way for the suspects in the car to object, in large part because they
had no way of knowing the eavesdropping program existed.
[101] Before tethered appliances, the exercise of government power was
checked by the many who actively participated in the programs, both as
agents of the government and as cooperating private parties.212 In The
Company, only the company was in a position to challenge the
government’s behavior. As surveillance becomes more automated, fewer
and fewer parties will be in this position. In effect, the popularity of
tethered appliances “diminishes the ability of a rule to attain legitimacy as
people choose to participate in its enforcement or at least not stand in its
way.”213
[102] James Wilson explained at the Constitutional Convention, “[l]aws
may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and
yet not so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them

208

Each System console has three buttons: (1) an emergency button, which
routes customers’ calls to the Company; (2) an information button,
which routes customers’ calls to the other company that assists the
customer with navigation; and (3) the roadside
assistance button, which routes customers’ calls to
the other company for assistance in getting on-site
service for vehicles. The System automatically
contacts the Company if an airbag deploys or the
vehicle’s supplemental restraint system activates.
Id. at 1134.
209
The Company v. United States, 349 F.3d 1132, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003).
210
Id. at 1137-38.
211
Id. at 1143.
212
See ZITTRAIN, supra note 9, at 117-18.
213
Id.

47

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIV, Issue 4

effect.”214 The ability of individuals to disobey or refuse to enforce laws
can provide lawmakers with the pressure and incentive to re-evaluate the
wisdom of laws. Federal alcohol prohibition was eliminated not only due
to widespread disobedience, but also due to the apathy of many nondrinkers who did not report bootleggers and the willingness of some law
enforcement officials to turn the other cheek.215 Today, California state
police officers’ unwillingness to help enforce federal law prohibiting the
use of “medical marijuana” is creating pressure to change federal drug
laws.216 This type of pressure is more difficult to create when laws are
enforced automatically. Systems of “perfect prevention” will eliminate
the opportunity for civil disobedience entirely, and systems of “perfect
surveillance” will require far fewer officials and private individuals to go
along with the program. Overall, perfect enforcement will decrease
society’s ability to gain the momentum needed to bring about changes to
unjust or unwise laws.
VII. CONCLUSION
[103] This Article has cataloged and explored several concerns one might
have about using technology to enforce law, embracing the use of
technology in some cases and repudiating it in others. Each concern was
illustrated with examples ranging from traffic cameras to web crawlers to
identification cards. Yet, the use of such a catalog is not principally in its
application to these particular cases, but in what might be learned and
applied to those we encounter in the future.
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[104] With a view towards these future, unknown cases, this article
concludes not with a summary, but with a list of questions that
policymakers and technologists can use to determine whether the use of a
technology to enforce law is wise.
1. Is it feasible to use the technology for the proposed purpose?
2. Will the technology generate an unreasonably high number of
false-positives or false-negatives? If so, can these mistakes be
corrected with the addition of a human element?
3. What are the potentials for abuse? What are the possible sideeffects of the technology being used? Can these potentials be
eliminated without making the technology ineffective?
4. Might the use of the technology trigger a First or Fourth
Amendment violation?
5. If the technology’s use is constitutional, might the use still
unwisely curtail speech or fair uses?
6. If the technology is designed to perfectly prevent a law
violation, are there any circumstances under which it would be
important or necessary to violate the law for a greater good?
7. Is the elimination of discretion in the law’s enforcement
problematic?
8. Does the technology intrude on one’s private space enough to
chill eccentric behavior or affect one’s ability to function
publicly?
9. Does the use of the technology unwisely shift the balance of
power between the government and its citizens?
[105] Questions 1 and 4 are deal-breaking; any program must be feasible
and must be constitutional. The other questions are factors that may often
cut in opposing directions, ultimately requiring a decision-maker to make
choices based on the totality of the circumstances. If these questions are
considered, such choices will be informed and justified, allowing
technology to be used without abusing those it is employed to protect.
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